DCI/IC 75-0543

26 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
                     AD/DCI/IC
                     PD/D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: NMCC Intelligence Support Requirements for
                    Crisis Management

1. On 21 February 1975, I met with Dr. Don R. Harris, a consultant to the WWMCCS Architecture Intelligence Interface Group. The meeting was informal and at his request. At lunch we discussed the progress of the DIA modernization program for the NMIC and how the NMIC would eventually interface with the NMCC as a part of the expanded National Military Command System.

2. Attached is a paper Dr. Harris prepared that addresses the subject above. I think it is worth reading. There are a number of implications for intelligence planning that may be of interest to

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[redacted] and I have provided them with a copy of this memorandum.

3. Based upon my discussion with Dr. Harris and a review of his paper, what follows are three issues, relating to the NMIC-NMCC and associated considerations:

    A. ISSUE

        The production of joint operational-intelligence
        situational reports for display on single screens
        or produced as single, integrated reports. What
        about NOIWON - Context?

        CONSIDERATIONS

        -- Protection of security of intelligence information

            - Clearances for all personnel in operations center

            - Security of transmission to displays in areas
              other than the NMCC

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- Procedures for indicating sensitivity of various elements of information contained in the report

-- Procedures for integration of operational and intelligence information

- Develop common format and agreed terminology

- Staff procedure for preparing joint situation plot

B. ISSUE

The provision by the NMIC of total, integrated analysis of all factors involved in a developing situation-- political, economic, social, environmental, and military. What role for the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and his Strategic Warning Staff? How will the NIOs fit into this system? Where do the Alert Memoranda fit?

CONSIDERATIONS

-- Effective and efficient interchange between NMIC and other national intelligence agencies of intelligence information, processed intelligence, and intelligence analysts and estimates

-- Availability of analysts in the NMIC who can perform requisite analysis and produce estimates of meaning and impact of a developing situation

-- Ability of NMIC analysts to conference electronically with analysts in other national intelligence agencies to coordinate analyses and estimates and to determine differences where they exist

C. ISSUE

The provision of direct, continuous, sensitive intelligence support to DoD leaders involved in crisis management meetings in the White House, Executive Office Building or Department of State

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CONSIDERATIONS

-- The need for a technical ability to provide at a national crisis management center the information available in the NMCC in a similar display

-- The need to solve security problems in the transmission phase and at the receiving end

-- The need to develop a means for an institution to interface with all aspects of NMIC reporting system

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4. The Harris memorandum is for information only, since [   ] have the action on this subject for the IC Staff. However, you might wish to discuss some of these issues with Major General Faurer at your next meeting.

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Captain, USAF
CS/ICS

Attachment: As Stated

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WWMCCS ARCHITECTURE--INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

NMCC Intelligence Support Requirements
Crisis Management

(7.2.3) I. Introduction

1. The design for the National Military Command System of the future has
taken account of problems in crisis management, especially as they have
occurred in the past, and the impact of changes in U.S. nuclear strategy.
It proposes an expanded National Military Command Center (ENMCC). It
states requirements for improved facilities and communications in and
interfaces with the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and
Logistics Command Center (LCC).

2. The Master Plan for the NMCS recognizes that while in periods of crisis
the NMCS will be comprised of the OJCS, NMCC, NMIC, and LCC operational
facilities, these facilities belong to other entities of the Department
of Defense and will continue to be in their respective chains of command.[1]
The problems inherent in this situation are faced up to in procedures which
reflect that in time of crisis these several centers will be working toward
common objectives and that all come under the ultimate command authority
of the Secretary of Defense.

3. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of Defense ele-
ment responsible for fulfilling the intelligence requirements of the NMCS,
has also responded to its demonstrated weaknesses in past crises by planning
a greatly strengthened NMIC. In particular, its design is directed to
eliminating the "severe degredation (the NMIC suffers) in time of rapid
change associated with periods of crisis."[2]

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[1] P3-005, Master Plan NMCS

[2] Pi, Volume 1, Design and Implementation Plan, DIA NMIC Project Office
and Rome Air Development Center, April 1974.

4. To this end a facility has been designed to accomodate a NMIC alert center team, assisted by automated data handling systems, which will be able to perform "primary intelligence support functions in normal, or non-crisis, times. These are the functions of detecting, analyzing, and reporting significant indications in the form of warning notifications, the generation of current intelligence reports, and the channeling of operational intelligence to the NMCC or other NMCS elements."[3] The system is designed to accomodate rapid augmentation when the situation so requires. The NMIC will have space and automated aids to support the increases in staff. This approach tends to minimize the start-up problem that has always been present in past major crises.

5. In the discussion which follows, intelligence support requirements of the NMCC in a crisis period will be specified. The NMIC design will be reviewed to develop a base-line for intelligence support that it will provide NMCC beginning in 1976-77. Certain problem areas will then be presented, discussing certain requirements that the system as designed will not meet.

II. NMCC Requirements for Intelligence Support, 1985

.6. The focus of the analysis of the intelligence interface of the NMCC is on crisis situations. These are the periods which put the greatest strain on the national security decision process. The Department of Defense has two important elements in this process, the Secretary of Defense as supported by the office and staff of the several Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, and the Joint Staff. They each relate differently to the process but the NMCS is charged with supporting both.

7. It should be noted that the requirements on the NMCC posed by a crisis situation overlaps those inherent in the decision process concerning the

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[3] PP 1 & 2, D&IP

tegic and tactical watch functions apply across the board, in normal conditions, in a crisis, and in a conventional or war threatening situation. Similarly in all crisis, general purpose war and nuclear war situations, except for a surprise "bolt-from-the-blue" strategic nuclear attack on the U.S., continuous intelligence information on the enemy capabilities and intentions are needed. However, if a crisis evolves into a war situation, conventional or nuclear, a unique set of intelligence requirements develop. The assessment of damage and of the impact of enemy military activity must be reported in detail and as rapidly as possible.

A. NMCC Day-To-Day Intelligence Requirements

8. NMCC intelligence requirements on a day-to-day basis in a non-war, non-crisis situation are focused on giving warning of a situation developing which will lead to a crisis and/or war. The warning of war must include a capability which tells in seconds of a launch of nuclear missiles against the U.S. as well as days to week estimates of a Soviet general purpose focus attack in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The warning of impending crisis must clearly link a developing situation to a threat to specific U.S. interests in the area of concern. The occurrences of hostilities and conflict in the world is not enough to create a crisis; a threat to a U.S. interest must be involved. The warning should attempt to relate the calculation of seriousness of threat of conflict (as other harmful actions) to the value as worth of U.S. interests in the area.

9. The NMCC also needs daily intelligence reporting on the state of the world. The focus of effort should be on areas of defined U.S. national interest. The reporting, including brief statements of important events, development, and trends and analysis of this meaning, should emphasize warning. The longer the period between warning and a critical event occurring, the more likely the U.S. leaders can either avoid or minimize a crisis, as if it should occur, deal effectively with its causes with a minimum of confusion. The possibility of the events leading to a war situation could more readily be contained.

A. Soviet Union

   1) Military Forces

      a) A statement of any changes in deployment, posture,
         or equipment of major Soviet military elements.

      b) Notice of impending major training exercises.

      c) Estimates of Soviet reaction to U.S. force movements
         including reconnaissance, training, ship and fleet
         movements, shifts in ground and air unit deployment.

      d) Important hench marks in weapon systems research and
         development activities together with estimates of
         impact on existing projections of Soviet military
         posture.

   2) The Soviet Union, Other Than Military

      a) Note any political speeches or events that appear
         to have an important bearing on some aspect of Soviet
         foreign or defense policy and give an assessment of
         what the impact is or will be.

      b) Note any economic development that appears to have an
         impact on foreign or defense policy and give an assess-
         ment thereof.

      c) Note any important internal dissention and assess its
         impact on course of Soviet policy.

B. Communist China

      Cover the same items of intelligence listed for the
      Soviet Union.

C. Other Regions and Countries of the World

   1) The focus will be in a priority set by extent of U.S.
      interests involved.

2) The NMIC will be seeking to detect events and trends
that indicate that developments adverse to U.S. interests
will occur. The emphasis is on forewarning rather than
mere reporting.

3) The events and trends covered will include political,
economic, social, and military.

B. NMCC Requirements in a Crisis

11. Both the NMCC and the NMIC have dual functions during a crisis
period. They each must focus on the crisis, developing all pertinent
information as fast as possible and planning how to get more. The NMCC
must develop plans for dealing with the crisis, in most cases new or
modified plans as the crisis proceed through stages. But both organiza-
tions must also handle the day-to-day problems in all areas not involved
in the crisis. In particular, the NMIC must search for events that might
indicate developments elsewhere that are threatening to U.S. interests.
In part, some of these activities elsewhere might be caused indirectly
by the crisis.

12. Specifically, it would appear that in a crisis period the NMCC would
require the following types of information from the NMIC:

A. NMCC Requirements During the Crisis Initiation:
1) To be able to answer, in ever increasing detail and with
heightened accuracy, repeated questions from the President
and his chief advisors including:
a) Who did what to whom.
b) What is the status of Soviet forces, in the area,
and world-wide.
c) If the crisis is in the Pacific area, a similar status
report with respect to the North Koreans and Communist
China.
d) What additional events are likely to happen in the
crisis area and when and by whom and to what end.

crisis area as a basis for planning or updating of
existing contingency plans, including:

a) Transportation capabilities including airfields,
   harbors, raillines, major highways, etc.

b) Crisis specific information--if the crisis is the
   result of a natural cause such as a flood then infor-
   mation will be required on numbers of injured food
   supplies, medical supplies, etc. If the crisis is
   caused by an assassination, then information is
   needed quickly on political grounds and their loyal-
   ties, the status of sympathies in the military forces,
   etc. In all cases immediate information is required
   on numbers of Americans in the area in case evacuation
   must be planned for.

B. NMCC Requirements During the Crisis Period:

1) A continuous flow of information reporting events as they
    are occurring in the crisis situation. Periodically, the
    NMIC must summarize the events that have happened and pro-
    duce a base-line statement of the situation as of a specific
    time. Intelligence base-line statement must be timed to
    conform to operational base-line summaries, in a common
    format, and readily integrated into a single report.
    Reporting must include political, economic, social, and
    military events. Reporting must be from all U.S. elements
    in the area including the Embassy, Defense Attache's,
    CIA station, NSA element, any military command and to
    extent possible from other national governments and/or
    either elements in the area. Reports to NMCC must be
    on all-source basis. If any sources excluded, DDO must be
    notified so he can warn the J-3, Director Joint Staff,
    Chairman and JCS, and Secretary of Defense.

2)   At least daily (and more often if required) updates of
the status and deployment of Soviet (and where indicated
other Communist) forces. This must be cpaable of integra-
tions into a report on status of U.S. forces, as both can
be read or viewed at the same time in the same format.

3)   Daily reporting of press opinion and official views as
expressed in speeches in major countries as they reflect
support or opposition to U.S. positions or aid to one
group of participants in the crisis, etc.

4)   Periodic estimates by the intelligence analysts of the
meaning for the immediate future of events that are
occurring. Only to the extent that these are produced in
a timely fashion and are accurate will the NMCC planners
be able to develop plans that can be effective in the
crisis situation. Estimates must deal on an integrated
basis with all factors influencing in the crisis--political,
economic, social, and military.

5)   Estimates of reactions to U.S. policy options as requested
by the NMCC including those by major participants in the
crisis, the Soviets, Communist Chinese, etc.

III.   NMIC Capability 1976-77

13.   On the basis of approved plans, by 1976-77 the NMIC will be able to
meet most of the NMCC crisis requirements outlined above. The NMIC facil-
ities will be enlarged and co-located with the NMCC. The number of personnel
on watch will be increased and will include trained persons to cover the
regions of world who not only can alert the NMCC but can give them a
first-cut statement of what the event or events portend. The efficiency
of the NMIC operations will be enhanced by an automated information
handling system. However, some problem areas will remain. The most impor-
tant include:

a)   The ability of the NMIC to provide political and economic
analysis equal to that produced in military field.

b) The adequacy of political and economic information received.

c) The constraints on integrated operational and intelligence

reporting posed by compartmentation of intelligence infor-

mation. In large measure, the reason for constraints have

to do with protecting sources or concealing system operational

data.